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The views and perspectives contained in these Blogs are from individual contributors and external sources, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or position of the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva. The links are neither intended as an endorsement of particular publications nor the only source for the updates, but to connect to information in the public domain, for those interested in background or further details.

DOHA – "They are armed, I am not going to fight a losing battle and kill my men over a demolished shrine," said Fawzi Abd al-'Aali, the former Libyan interior minister, before he "resigned" last August. He was referring to the armed Salafi groups that were accused of destroying Sufi shrines. One of the accused groups was the Ansar al-Shariah Brigade, which was quick to support the demolition, but denied any responsibility for it.

Ahmed Jibril, Libya's deputy ambassador to London, has now accused the Brigade, headed by Muhammed Ali Al-Zahawy, of perpetrating the attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi, which killed the American ambassador, Christopher Stevens, and three other US personnel, as well as Libyan guards. Others have quickly embraced and promoted Jibril's allegation. But the picture is more complex.

The Brigade denied responsibility in a written statement, as well as in a brief interview with its spokesperson, who at the time was in charge of guarding Al Jala Hospital in Benghazi. Like its statement on the destruction of Sufi shrines, it denied involvement in the attack on the US Consulate, but stressed the gravity of the insult against the Prophet that putatively triggered it.

The Brigade attracted public attention last June as well, when around 300 armed members staged a rally in Benghazi, sparking outrage among Libyans. "We wanted to send a message to the General National Council members," according to Hashim Al-Nawa', one of the Brigade's commanders. "They should not come near the Shariah. It should be above the constitution, and not an article for referendum."

CAIRO – "You are the authority, above any other authority. You are the protectors, whoever seeks protection away from you is a fool...and the army and the police are hearing me," said Egypt's president-elect, Mohamed Morsi, to hundreds of thousands in Tahrir Square. A man imprisoned following the "Friday of Rage" (January 28, 2011) took the presidential oath in Tahrir on a "Friday of Power Transfer" (June 29, 2012). But he almost did not.

Ten days earlier, on June 19, I was with a group of former Egyptian MPs in Tahrir Square. One received a phone call informing him that a senior Muslim Brotherhood leader was coming to announce that the group was being blackmailed: either accept the constitutional addendum decreed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which practically eviscerated the presidency, or the presidential election's outcome would not be decided in the Brothers' favor. An hour later, the senior figure had not shown up. "The talks were about to collapse, but they resumed," said the former MP. "Hold your breath."

The victory of the Brotherhood's Morsi in Egypt's first free presidential election is a historic step forward on Egypt's rocky democratization path. His challenger, former President Hosni Mubarak's last prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, had no chance of winning a clean vote, despite the support of a huge state-controlled propaganda machine and various tycoons. "How many people can they trick, convince, or buy? We don't have that short a memory," a taxi driver told me when I asked whether he would vote for Shafiq.

CAIRO – "Bashar should abandon power and retire safely in Egypt. The general-prosecutor is murder-friendly," a friend, referring to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, told me as we watched former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's trial in the Police Academy's criminal court. Although Mubarak and his interior (security) minister, Habib al-Adly, were handed life sentences at the conclusion of their trials, the generals who ran Egypt's apparatus of repression as deputy interior ministers were acquitted.

Hasan Abd al-Rahman, head of the notorious, Stasi-like State Security Investigations (SSI); Ahmad Ramzi, head of the Central Security Forces (CSF); Adly Fayyid, the head of Public Security; Ismail al-Shaer, who led the Cairo Security Directorate (CSD); Osama Youssef, the head of the Giza Security Directorate; and Omar Faramawy, who oversaw of the 6th of October Security Directorate, were all cleared of any wrongdoing. Lawyers for Mubarak and al-Adly will appeal their life-sentences, and many Egyptians believe that they will receive lighter sentences.

The verdicts sent an unmistakable message, one with serious consequences for Egypt's political transition. A spontaneous cry was heard from the lawyers and the families of victims when they were announced: "The people want to cleanse the judiciary."

CAIRO – Everything about Egypt's revolution has been unexpected, and the first-round results in the country's first-ever competitive presidential election are no different. The rise of former President Hosni Mubarak's last prime minister, General Ahmad Shafiq, who will enter the presidential runoff alongside the Muslim Brothers (MB) candidate Mohamed Morsi, has raised eyebrows across the political spectrum. So did the meteoric rise of the Nasserist candidate Hamdin Sabbahi to third place, and the fourth-place finish of Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, who was backed by liberals and hardline Salafi Islamists alike.

Egypt's voters overwhelmingly chose the revolution over the old regime, and shattered the myth that the push for change is an urban, middle-class, Cairo-based phenomenon: the eight revolutionary candidates received more than 16.4 million votes. But their failure to unite on a single platform directly benefited Shafiq, who unexpectedly won 5.9 million votes (assuming no election-rigging).

Shafiq's success shocked many revolutionaries. "He is a murderer. His place is in jail, not on top of Egypt after the revolution," said one activist. Indeed, Shafiq has been linked to multiple cases of corruption and repression, including the "battle of the camels" on February 2, 2011, when Mubarak's henchmen attacked Tahrir Square, killing and wounding protesters.

CAIRO – "Whatever the majority in the People's Assembly, they are very welcome, because they won't have the ability to impose anything that the people don't want." Thus declared General Mukhtar al-Mulla, a member of Egypt's ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

Al-Mulla's message was that the Islamists' victory in Egypt's recent election gives them neither executive power nor control of the framing of a new constitution. But General Sami Anan, Chief of Staff and the SCAF's deputy head, quickly countered that al-Mulla's statement does not necessarily represent the official views of the Council.

So, one year after the revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarak, who, exactly, will set Egypt's political direction?

The electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood's political wing and the Salafi parties, which together won more than 70% of the parliamentary seats, will give them strong influence over the transitional period and in drafting the constitution. But they are not alone. Aside from the Islamists, two other powerful actors will have their say: the "Tahrirists" and the generals.