Logo CFG Header
 

Contributions

The views and perspectives contained in these Blogs are from individual contributors and external sources, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or position of the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva. The links are neither intended as an endorsement of particular publications nor the only source for the updates, but to connect to information in the public domain, for those interested in background or further details.

التأسيس والنشأة:

بدأ اول حضور معاصر للسلفية اليمنية في آواخر السبعينات حين عاد الى اليمن من السعودية الشيخ والمحدث اليمني مقبل بن هادي الوادعي وهو شيخ يمني من محافظة صعدة كان زيديا من الزيدية التي هي إحدى مذاهب الشيعة المعتدلين ثم انسلخ عنهم وتحول الى المذهب السني وتحديدا السلفي ودرس العلوم الشرعية في السعودية ثم رجع الى اليمن وأسس مدرسة دينية تعلم العلوم الشرعية والدينية من قرآن وحديث ولغة عربية وفقه الخ وذلك في قريته دماج في محافظة صعدة واشتهر هذا المركز من بداية الثمانينات وتوافد إليه الكثير من اليمنيين والعرب والغربيين ليطلبوا العلم ثم توسع تيار الشيخ الوادعي في كل انحاء اليمن وأصبح هناك عدة مدارس سلفية في عدة مناطق ومحافظات يمنية وكان هذا التيار من بداية الثمانينات الى منتصفها تيارا علميا مدرسيا غير منظم في حزب او تنظيم يهتم بنشر العلوم الشرعية ولا يقر الدخول في السياسة ويرى ان الحاكم ما دام مسلما هو ولي امر شرعي للمسلمين تجب طاعته.

The title is interesting because there is a song that says "WHO LET THE DOGS OUT?"

This piece: "WHO LET THE JIHADIS OUT?" by Hossam Bahgat comes basically to say that SCAF (not Morsi) is the one that let the Jihadis out.

Bahgat said: "MadaMasr's investigation shows that Morsi released 27 Islamists during his rule. The military council released over 800."

Here, the point for Bahgat was not defending Morsi, but it is to point to the abuse of the issue and the deliberate misinformation by both the Minister of Interior and the media (local and international – as he pointed to Associated Press) in this regard.

Bahgat used basically the case of Nabil Mohamed Abdel Meguid al-Maghrabi to make his first case against the minister of interior.

Bahgat said: "Maghrabi's name, alongside those of other suspects, was interesting. Maghrabi was detained in 1979 under the state of emergency, imposed since 1967. Two years later he was accused of involvement in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, although he was already in jail. Now the minister was suggesting the septuagenarian former jihadi had resumed his activities and recreated his organizational links after more than three decades in prison."

When Bahgat criticized a report published by the Associated Press on December 3, filed by bureau chief Hamza Hendawy, he pointed that the information in the report by AP that Morsi released Jihadis as "Morsi issued nine pardons starting soon after he was inaugurated, releasing some 2,000 people" was incorrect because these 2000 were basically from the youth of the revolution detained during the 17 months of SCAF rule (February 2011 till July 2012). They were not radical Islamists. Later, Bhagat pointed that the Jihadis released by Morsi were few compared to those released by SCAF.

En marge de la clôture du Sommet de l'Elysée pour la Paix et la Sécurité en Afrique, le président François Hollande a raffermi la position de la France au Mali en plaidant pour le désarmement du Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) et pour son inclusion dans un dialogue politique avec Bamako. La déclaration du chef d'Etat français intervient comme une réponse au communiqué du 29 novembre dernier où le vice-président de l'organisation indépendantiste touarègue a mis fin au cessez-le-feu négocié quelques mois plus tôt lors des accords de Ouagadougou. Si le compromis alors trouvé était parvenu à contourner la question épineuse du désarmement du MNLA en assurant la tenue des élections législatives du 24 novembre dernier, la reprise des tensions marque l'épilogue d'une parenthèse aux allures démocratiques censée préparer les conditions d'une sortie de crise. Une parenthèse basée sur des accords fragiles qui ont certes permis l'organisation des élections présidentielles de juillet 2013, mais qui n'ont en rien changé la position de Bamako et de ses alliés étrangers vis-à-vis des revendications touarègues.

L'attitude de la communauté internationale, menée par la France et l'Union Européenne[1], relaie en effet le ton menaçant de la Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO) à l'égard d'une contestation touarègue vieille de plus d'un demi-siècle. Au mois d'avril 2012, suite à la proclamation de l'indépendance de l'Azawad, territoire des populations touarègues au nord du Mali, un communiqué de la CEDEAO avait réaffirmé que « le Mali est "un et indivisible" et qu'elle usera de tous les moyens, y compris le recours à la force, pour assurer l'intégrité territoriale du pays. »[2] Une menace visant, il est vrai, les nombreux groupes affiliés ou dissidents d'Al-Qaeda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) présents dans la région, mais aussi des populations géographiquement et politiquement isolées que le gouvernement de Bamako et ses alliés européens peinent à inclure dans leur projet démocratique. Le traitement gouvernemental à l'égard de la cause autonomiste de l'Azawad, y compris dans sa version laïque telle qu'exprimée dans les rangs du MNLA, représente aujourd'hui encore l'un des principaux obstacles à l'émancipation démocratique du pays.

1: History Being Repeated

"Structures are always similar in their main features, but they always vary in the delicate details to give some flavor to the acts of history when it repeats itself; yet, every time, it is repeated with many new twists".

It was once said that Tunisia is not Egypt; claiming that the revolution in Tunisia cannot reach or take place in Egypt. The assumption of the fool is always to build an argument based on detailed differences and ignoring the most shocking and alarming similarities. Egypt was another Tunisia after all as it witnessed a revolution on January 25th, 2011.

Celebrating Assad's troops fearless killing of all Syrians, it was said that Syria is not going to be another Arab Sprig country. It was claimed that "Assad has managed to impose his will on the leaders of the world". To the surprise of many, this was the opinion of Olivier Roy expressed in February 2012 when speaking to France 2 channel. Such arguments would have remained true and could have become completely true if one could claim that Bashar Al Assad – who continued to use aggressive military force against his people for more than two and half years – will succeed in what Gaddafi tried to do in Libya in six months of fighting before he was killed.

Now, it is said that Egypt is not Syria; yet, who could be sure that the acts, procedures and mode of handling the opposition by the regime in Syria are not being cloned in Egypt by Abdel Fattah El Sisi. Who could be sure that the disaster in Syria will not be repeated in Egypt against the Brotherhood, the Islamists and consequently the whole society in the same way where the situation escalated in Syria between Bashar and the rest of the non-Baathist Syrians in their different colors?

Syria did not and does not need a Coup or a Counter-Revolution like Egypt now. This is for a simple reason; the regime of Assad still stands and the man on the top of it feels secure against any genuine western, European or American, attempt to remove him from office. El Sisi just thinks the same. He thinks that the more he becomes similar to Bashar Al Assad in everything, the more he would become immune against any act against him by the West. He believed that he would be everlasting in office as long as the Westerners will eventually absorb the shock of the Coup and start dealing with him when he becomes officially and democratically elected as President (of course, the Mubarak way and not the Morsi way).

The political advisor to the interim President (advisor and now spokesman of the military regime) was a good choice for the military junta to justify the killing that took place in what we could name "The Black August" over the past week (on August 14th in Rabaa and Nahda then 16th and 17th throughout the nation).

Compared with El Baradei who resigned over the killing and the bloodshed, and who opposed the use of force to end the sit-ins and called for peaceful solutions, Hegazy is the direct true opposite, as he, representing the Egyptian everlasting militarized ideology, is a person who believes in building a "modern" nation and a State by all Egyptians who are "united more than ever before", as he said, behind "the military" (and – of course – a charismatic military ruler).

It was not haphazard that the new "militarized" regime chose Hegazy to represent them in this press conference, being well dressed in a civilian uniform and well versed in English language. He was a good replacement to El Baradei as a civilian and Col. Ahmed Ali, the military spokesman. Hegazy does not have to lie because he defends his own belief on this matter; he defends "the rule of the military generals" as the path to "modernity" as an alternative to democracy under the strictly unified mentally pre militarized mass of the society.

This was exactly the dream and the modernist project of Mohamed Ali Basha in the 19th century and then that of Nasser with a Marxist Maoist twist in the 20th century. It is exactly equal to the Nazi way in Germany of Adolf Hitler who wanted to inspire the German nation towards that end. It seems elementary certain that Hegazy believes that El Sisi and the military would be the objective equal to Mohammed Ali and Nasser in the 21st century version.