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The title is interesting because there is a song that says "WHO LET THE DOGS OUT?"

This piece: "WHO LET THE JIHADIS OUT?" by Hossam Bahgat comes basically to say that SCAF (not Morsi) is the one that let the Jihadis out.

Bahgat said: "MadaMasr's investigation shows that Morsi released 27 Islamists during his rule. The military council released over 800."

Here, the point for Bahgat was not defending Morsi, but it is to point to the abuse of the issue and the deliberate misinformation by both the Minister of Interior and the media (local and international – as he pointed to Associated Press) in this regard.

Bahgat used basically the case of Nabil Mohamed Abdel Meguid al-Maghrabi to make his first case against the minister of interior.

Bahgat said: "Maghrabi's name, alongside those of other suspects, was interesting. Maghrabi was detained in 1979 under the state of emergency, imposed since 1967. Two years later he was accused of involvement in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, although he was already in jail. Now the minister was suggesting the septuagenarian former jihadi had resumed his activities and recreated his organizational links after more than three decades in prison."

When Bahgat criticized a report published by the Associated Press on December 3, filed by bureau chief Hamza Hendawy, he pointed that the information in the report by AP that Morsi released Jihadis as "Morsi issued nine pardons starting soon after he was inaugurated, releasing some 2,000 people" was incorrect because these 2000 were basically from the youth of the revolution detained during the 17 months of SCAF rule (February 2011 till July 2012). They were not radical Islamists. Later, Bhagat pointed that the Jihadis released by Morsi were few compared to those released by SCAF.

1: History Being Repeated

"Structures are always similar in their main features, but they always vary in the delicate details to give some flavor to the acts of history when it repeats itself; yet, every time, it is repeated with many new twists".

It was once said that Tunisia is not Egypt; claiming that the revolution in Tunisia cannot reach or take place in Egypt. The assumption of the fool is always to build an argument based on detailed differences and ignoring the most shocking and alarming similarities. Egypt was another Tunisia after all as it witnessed a revolution on January 25th, 2011.

Celebrating Assad's troops fearless killing of all Syrians, it was said that Syria is not going to be another Arab Sprig country. It was claimed that "Assad has managed to impose his will on the leaders of the world". To the surprise of many, this was the opinion of Olivier Roy expressed in February 2012 when speaking to France 2 channel. Such arguments would have remained true and could have become completely true if one could claim that Bashar Al Assad – who continued to use aggressive military force against his people for more than two and half years – will succeed in what Gaddafi tried to do in Libya in six months of fighting before he was killed.

Now, it is said that Egypt is not Syria; yet, who could be sure that the acts, procedures and mode of handling the opposition by the regime in Syria are not being cloned in Egypt by Abdel Fattah El Sisi. Who could be sure that the disaster in Syria will not be repeated in Egypt against the Brotherhood, the Islamists and consequently the whole society in the same way where the situation escalated in Syria between Bashar and the rest of the non-Baathist Syrians in their different colors?

Syria did not and does not need a Coup or a Counter-Revolution like Egypt now. This is for a simple reason; the regime of Assad still stands and the man on the top of it feels secure against any genuine western, European or American, attempt to remove him from office. El Sisi just thinks the same. He thinks that the more he becomes similar to Bashar Al Assad in everything, the more he would become immune against any act against him by the West. He believed that he would be everlasting in office as long as the Westerners will eventually absorb the shock of the Coup and start dealing with him when he becomes officially and democratically elected as President (of course, the Mubarak way and not the Morsi way).

The political advisor to the interim President (advisor and now spokesman of the military regime) was a good choice for the military junta to justify the killing that took place in what we could name "The Black August" over the past week (on August 14th in Rabaa and Nahda then 16th and 17th throughout the nation).

Compared with El Baradei who resigned over the killing and the bloodshed, and who opposed the use of force to end the sit-ins and called for peaceful solutions, Hegazy is the direct true opposite, as he, representing the Egyptian everlasting militarized ideology, is a person who believes in building a "modern" nation and a State by all Egyptians who are "united more than ever before", as he said, behind "the military" (and – of course – a charismatic military ruler).

It was not haphazard that the new "militarized" regime chose Hegazy to represent them in this press conference, being well dressed in a civilian uniform and well versed in English language. He was a good replacement to El Baradei as a civilian and Col. Ahmed Ali, the military spokesman. Hegazy does not have to lie because he defends his own belief on this matter; he defends "the rule of the military generals" as the path to "modernity" as an alternative to democracy under the strictly unified mentally pre militarized mass of the society.

This was exactly the dream and the modernist project of Mohamed Ali Basha in the 19th century and then that of Nasser with a Marxist Maoist twist in the 20th century. It is exactly equal to the Nazi way in Germany of Adolf Hitler who wanted to inspire the German nation towards that end. It seems elementary certain that Hegazy believes that El Sisi and the military would be the objective equal to Mohammed Ali and Nasser in the 21st century version.

The past days' events in Egypt demonstrate the extreme virulence of a military dictatorship that seems to be back (or remained) in the political arena, the incapacity of the international community to firmly condemn the violence used against civilians, when it is so-called led against "islamists", and the manipulation's strategy driven by a power that cannot rely on any democratic legitimacy.

Came to power through what is first, described as a revolution by those who, ignoring the democratic frame when applied to islamists, reject the idea of a coup d'état, the army now reveals its true face, strengthening some people in their blind support to a brutish regime, as long as it pretends to be opposed to 'bearded people', sometimes embarrassing its followers from the first days, when it is not scaring away to Vienna its supposed leader, worried to be one day sued for crimes against humanity.

We are told that some churches are burnt down, Christians are threatened, and museums are stolen. The "charia" application is claimed, "djihad" is called. Over and above the death of individuals, it seems that once again we assist, and in the extension of a politics expressed by Bush in 2001, to a war between the "good" and the "evil". Today, the army introduces itself as the life saver of Egypt, the Middle East, even of the world against obscurantism and the conservatism of the so-called islamists. Playing the modernity and minorities' protector card, the army justifies by the violence used against Coptics and the destruction of the national heritage, the declaration of the state of emergency and the bloody repression towards the "guilty": the Muslim Brothers or the islamists in general.

The ousting of President Mohamed Morsi by the Egyptian army is a military coup d'état pure and simple. Morsi's ousting qualifies for a military putsch which is by definition the illegal removal of the head of the state by the army or a faction within it, or the security services, through the use of force or the threat to using it. Past experiences of military coup d'état such as the toppling of the Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953, Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, and the military putsch in Algeria in 1992 remind us that military coups are never a smart tool for conflict resolution. The military coup in Egypt is a regrettable testimony for the failure of all political actors and stakeholders to manage the transition period, as a result of acute polarization. Now that the constitution has been suspended and the army has taken over what are the challenges faced by Egypt today?

June 30, 2013 marks the last day of the first year of President Morsi's rule in Egypt. For his supporters, this is something to celebrate as Egypt completes a year of democracy under democratically elected President. For his opponents, this is his last day in power.

The language of certainty was much higher amongst the opponents maybe a month ago, when the mobilization of Rebel (Tamarrud) movement was high collecting signatures to sack the President (withdraw confidence as they called it). The support to the President at that time from his group (the Muslim Brotherhood) was rather doubtful; some people expected that the group that dominated the Egyptian politics over this year of Morsi's rule would sacrifice the President to keep the organization intact, or that the Brotherhood would make all the possible retreats and present all the possible concessions to save itself and maybe the President. The anticipation was that Morsi would accept a referendum on his rule if not an early Presidential elections.

To defuse this certainty, Impartiality (Tagarrud) movement was launched as an opponent to Tamarrud. It was exactly the same way the Conscience (Dameer) Front was established to defuse the Salvation (Inquaz) Front.

Yet, the difference was striking. Dameer Front was made of benign quasi-Islamist and partially-secular supporters of Morsi. It was answering the Salvation Front made of secular liberal and socialist opponents. The realm of ideology dichotomy was still apparent; and things were not sorted as Islam versus Secularism at that point. But the second wave of opposing Morsi was totally different; it was fully radical against the Brotherhood and their so called "Islamic Rule" as the tone became higher by Tamarrud and the call became pro having a full rebellion and establishing a whole new regime through the "popular revolutionary will" and by means of violence (if necessary). This was highly spear-headed this time by the Popular Current (Hamdeen sabbahi) whose ideology matches that of Tamarrud and where the key leaders of the rebel movement come from this Populist Nasserist Socialist current. The tone was totally high against the Brotherhood as an Islamist group rather than a political opponent represented through the Freedom and Justice Party. Describing the Brotherhood as Kherfan (cheep) was abundant to the point that the cause was portrayed as a battle between Islam versus Secularism. This ignited a fully Islamist support to Morsi in the form of Tagarrud movement spear-headed by the Jamaa Islameyya and its Construction and Development Party.